Public attitudes towards renewable energy technologies in Norway. The role of party preferences by Karlstrøm, Henrik & Ryghaug, Marianne
1 
 
Public attitudes towards renewable energy technologies in 
Norway. The role of party preferences 
Henrik Karlstrøm1 and Marianne Ryghaug1 
Corresponding author  
Henrik Karlstrøm, Centre for Energy and Society, Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology. 7491 NTNU, Trondheim, Norway. 
Telephone: +47 73591765 
Email: henrik.karlstrom@ntnu.no 
Abstract 
Transition to a sustainable society requires large-scale conversion of the energy system to 
new, renewable, non-fossil sources of energy. This presupposes public support for new 
technologies, which means the public must deal with challenges in terms of placement, 
area requirements, ecological degradation and price developments. This paper discusses 
how citizens view renewable energy technologies. It analyses responses to representative 
surveys of the Norwegian population on the desirability of various energy technologies such 
as hydroelectric dams, onshore and offshore wind energy, bioenergy plants and, for 
contrast, gas plants with and without carbon capture and storage. Our main focus is on the 
influence of party political preference on views of renewable energy. We find that the 
sometimes lukewarm enthusiasm for renewable energy technologies cannot be fully 
explained by existing theories and that political party preference has a larger impact on 
energy technology attitudes than previously believed. 
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Introduction 
Increasingly, there is scientific and political agreement that the world’s consumption of 
fossil fuels must be phased out due both to the threat of destructive climate change and 
the future shortage of available fuels. This has profound consequences for the global 
energy system, which must move towards more sustainable modes of production and 
consumption. While more efficient energy use can substantially contribute to alleviating 
the problem, a successful transition to a sustainable society requires the large-scale 
conversion of the energy system to new, renewable, non-fossil sources of energy. This 
transition brings with it a host of new challenges, including issues such as local area 
planning and requirements, environmental degradation, and price developments. It also 
requires acceptance and a positive public perception of the new technologies, which in turn 
relies on the public’s evaluation of the positive and negative aspects of new renewable 
construction. In order words, positive attitude is an important issue shaping the widespread 
implementation of renewable energy technologies and the achievement of energy policy 
targets. It is commonly assumed that ‘public attitudes’ need to change to make more 
radical scenarios about the implementation of renewable energy technologies possible 
(Devine-Wright 2008a).  
The Norwegian electricity system is dominated by renewable hydroelectricity, itself a clean 
and cheap energy source. In the period from the end of WWII to the late 1980s, several 
factors combined to accustom both individual and large-scale Norwegian electricity 
consumers to abundant electricity at a very low price. Norway has many waterfalls and a 
history of social democratic governments willing to subsidise dam construction to provide 
cheap electricity for industry and price controls for household consumers. It also has had a 
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highly centralised supply-driven approach to generation and transmission of electricity that 
relied on constructing new production capacity well in advance of increases in demand 
(Thue 1996). This means that many Norwegian hydro plants have been in operation for 
decades and are paid for many times over. 
However, the last large-scale hydro development in Norway took place in the early 1980s, 
when a large dam project in the far north was constructed against opposition from 
conservationists and indigenous activists. The controversy led to a de facto moratorium on 
large hydro dam constructions. There are not many large waterfalls not already used for 
electricity production left in Norway, and using the remaining few for electricity production 
would be extremely controversial. As a result, when demand for electricity caught up with 
available supply towards the end of the 1990s, the question of more small-scale new 
electricity generation came to the forefront of public discussion. At the same time, Norway 
committed to increasing its production of renewable energy through EU agreements 
(Skjølsvold, Ryghaug, and Dugstad 2013). Norwegian geography allows for the best wind 
resources in Europe, both on- and offshore, so the theoretical potential for new renewable 
energy is significant. 
Today Norway finds itself in a paradoxical situation regarding the role that new production 
of energy from renewable energy sources should play in the Norwegian energy system. On 
one hand, new types of renewable energy are far away from being competitive with the 
country’s traditionally cheap main source of electricity and therefore need some sort of 
public support or subsidies in order to be realised. Norway has chosen to adopt a 
“technology neutral” approach to renewables, meaning a fixed governmental support for 
renewable production regardless of type. So far, the renewable construction has been 
mainly wind and small-scale hydro. However, a new green certificate subsidy scheme is in 
place, which promises to lower the economic barriers to new projects (“Electricity Markets 
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Agreement” 2011).  On the other hand economists and others are claiming that Norway 
does not need more production of renewable energy as the domestic electricity demand 
has levelled out, the country is already more or less self-sufficient with predominantly 
renewable energy, and measures to enhance the production will in practise lead to 
subsidising electricity production in Europe (Bye, Hoel, and Strøm 1999). In relation to this a 
much discussed idea has been to use Norwegian hydropower as a “green battery” for 
Europe, aiding a transition towards European low carbon societies (Skjølsvold, Ryghaug, 
and Dugstad 2013) as the storage capacity of this hydropower system could be used to 
offset the intermittent  nature of renewable energy. This is an argument for the need to 
increase the electricity production in Norway. However, this would require investments 
both in cables to Europe and it raises the tricky question about who should bear the costs. 
Thus, all in all the Norwegian public is faced with a rather complex situation regarding what 
role new renewable energy technologies should and could play in the energy system.  
In addition to renewables, Norwegian political debate has also turned around the possible 
construction of new gas power plants, which would utilise Norway’s considerable gas 
resources domestically, but also contribute to increased CO2 emissions. The controversy 
even caused a centre-right government coalition to split in 2000. Installation of carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) in gas power plants is one option that Norway has invested 
heavily in, with increased production and transportation of liquid gas as a goal. This means 
that the discussion of new renewables in Norway should be seen in the context of non-
renewable energy sources.  
This paper discusses how citizens view energy technologies and sources in Norway, in light 
of the situation described above. Rather than attempting to “solve” the problem of why 
new construction of renewables is slow or non-existing we wish to examine different types 
of renewable technologies and discuss some factors that might contribute to their 
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(un)popularity. Different types of renewable energy of course carry with them different 
sorts of potential problems and obstacles. Consequently, this paper should be seen as an 
attempt to outline some possibilities for an aggregate analysis of public attitudes towards 
disparate technologies and energy resources. We analyse survey responses by the 
Norwegian population on the desirability of various energy technologies such as hydro 
dams, onshore and offshore wind, bioenergy combustion plants and, for contrast, gas 
plants with and without carbon capture and storage technology. Are attitudes towards 
these energy sources the same? Are attitudes among different groups of the public the 
same, or if not, what can explain these differences? 
In the following sections, we first present location based and knowledge deficit theories of 
public attitudes regarding new renewable energy technologies.  Then we go on to discuss 
an alternative explanation that to a limited degree has been analysed in earlier studies of 
public attitudes towards energy sources, namely the role of political preferences, before 
testing these explanations empirically and finally offering some concluding remarks on the 
explanatory power of these theories as well as some thoughts on how to better approach 
the issue of public understanding of renewable energy technologies in the future. 
Public attitudes towards renewables and lack of support 
Energy users have heterogeneous interests, values and worldviews (Sovacool 2009). 
‘Energy’ possesses many different meanings in contemporary society (Aune 2007), and can 
be seen in relation to a scientific view, an economic view, an environmentalist view, a social 
welfare view and energy security (Stern and Aronson 1984), each of which differs in their 
conception of energy, diagnosis of what counts as energy problems, and policy 
prescriptions (Sovacool 2009). Several studies have attempted to identify levels of public 
understanding and awareness of different forms of energy technology and their impacts. 
These have produced a rather mixed set of findings, in part due to the varied nature of 
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questions asked. In terms of general energy knowledge, McGowan and Sauter (2005:12) 
found that respondents ‘tended to have only a vague idea of where energy was used but a 
rather better sense of the sources of energy’. Results suggest high levels of awareness that 
energy use is rising (e.g. Eurobarometer, 2003), that energy comes from a variety of sources 
and is often imported (e.g., Populus 2005), that renewable energy, particularly technologies 
such as solar panels, enjoy strong support both in the UK and across Europe, but that most 
individuals are reluctant to pay more for energy generated from renewable resources 
(Eurobarometer, 2006).  
 
Traditional social acceptance studies that query the general public on attitudes or support 
have tended to show widespread support for green energy technologies in the Europe 
(Sengers et al. 2010; Eurobarometer, 2008), demonstrating that the public generally views 
renewable energy very favourably. Interestingly enough, most literature on the public 
perception of renewable energy technologies focuses on public resistance (Devine-Wright 
2008a)2  especially when focusing on the site-specific nature of different renewables that 
often invites conflict with existing or planned land uses. The landscape itself can shape 
public attitudes towards renewables, as some landscapes are more valued than others 
(Sovacool 2009). However, aspects of social acceptance of renewable energy technology 
implementation was largely neglected when Norwegian policy programs specifically aimed 
at new renewable energy started in the 1980s as most developers, including energy 
companies, authorities, and private local investors thought that implementation was not a 
problem, because the first surveys on the public acceptance of renewables, in particular 
wind power, revealed very high levels of support of the technology (Wüstenhagen, Wolsink, 
and Bürer 2007a). Even though governments are increasingly interested in pushing for 
                                                          
2
 For instance see, Sengers et al (2010) for an analysis aiming at opening the black box of resistance 
to new energy technologies by analyzing media discourse. 
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more renewable developments, and the public generally view renewables favourably, 
specific construction projects often meet with resistance, both locally and on a national 
level. 
 
Several theories have been proposed to explain the fact that renewable energy production 
is often favourably viewed in theory while still meeting with a lot of resistance in actual 
construction situations. Most of these explanations are location based theories (Schively 
2007), claiming that one’s proximity to areas affected by new development is a key factor in 
opposition to for example wind farms. Among this set of theories the most prominent one 
is by far the NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) thesis that in short claims that while support for 
renewables might be strong in general, this support can quickly evaporate when the 
development moves close to one’s home. NIMBY explanations have been extensively 
criticised in the literature, among other things, for focusing too much on individuals’ 
perceptions of renewables and not enough on the wider social context within which these 
perceptions are formed (Bell, Gray, and Haggett 2005)  Critics have demonstrated that 
people’s reasons for opposing renewable energy encompass a broad range of social and 
personal factors affecting human interactions with social and political institutions that 
extend beyond NIMBYism (West, Bailey, and Winter 2010; Upreti and van der Horst 2004; 
Bell, Gray, and Haggett 2005; Walker 2008; Wüstenhagen, Wolsink, and Bürer 2007a; 
Walker and Cass 2007). Most of the literature which seeks to explain so called ‘NIMBY’ 
responses is naturally based on case studies within particular localities as understandings of 
support and opposition for particular developments must be understood in context (Aitken 
2010). Here our focus is not on specific renewable energy developments touching upon the 
lives of Publics-in-Particular. Rather we are examining the views of the Publics-in-General 
on renewable energy technologies through a large N study that is poorly suited to verify the 
validity of NIMBY explanations.   
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Location based theories are of course not the only explanations offered in the literature on 
support/resistance to renewables. Some have also framed resistance as a result of a 
general information or ‘knowledge deficit’, assuming that more knowledge about a 
technology leads to more positive sentiments towards it (Brunk 2006). In line with this, 
some studies indicate that support for new renewables increases if respondents are given 
thorough information about the pros and cons of new developments in advance (Ogarra, 
Mourato, and Pearson 2005). This vision of well-informed citizens faithfully supporting new 
technological developments has nonetheless been criticised repeatedly (Tipaldo 2011; 
Devine-Wright 2008b) and previous studies have also found that education does little to 
reduce differences between advocates of conventional and alternative energy technologies 
(Gottlieb and Matre 1976). To sum up, the knowledge deficit model has been met with a lot 
of criticism and there is still much uncertainty about what “knowledge” in the case of new 
renewables really constitutes, not to mention what shape it should take and how it should 
be disseminated in order to make people more positive towards these technologies (Ricci, 
Bellaby, and Flynn 2008).3 What kind of knowledge is needed? Is it facts about the working 
of the technology, better understanding of energy policy and the energy system or perhaps 
effects of the technology on for instance climate mitigation that would count as relevant 
knowledge in this case? This may be interesting questions to scrutinize further when 
studying the development of specific plants. 
Socio-demographic variables  
Given that the exact information of each respondent is hard to gauge, for our analysis we 
will settle with a more general examination of how level of education may influence the 
                                                          
3
 After all, it is unlikely that one will get the opportunity to carefully explain this particular issue in 
long conversations with every single citizen. 
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support or opposition to different energy technologies, as an indirect measure of 
knowledge about energy. In addition to education, various background variables have been 
found to affect attitudes towards renewables. One of them is age. Earlier studies from the 
UK give a somewhat unclear picture of the relationship between attitudes towards 
renewable energy and age, as some regional surveys have found higher levels of opposition 
towards renewable energy amongst older respondents (Mcgowan and Sauter 2005), while 
a national study found levels of opposition to be lower in younger and older cohorts (ages 
16-24 and 65+) in comparison with middle-aged respondents. A study of the Australian 
public demonstrated that the support of renewable energy is stronger among younger 
Australians (Tranter 2011). There are few explanations as to why this category should play a 
role, but is not inconceivable that generational effects on attitudes can be found. Gender 
has previously been known to play a role regarding environmental concern, and may 
therefore be expected to affect attitudes towards renewables. In general, surveys have 
demonstrated fairly consistent results that women are more environmentally oriented than 
men (Dietz, Stern, and Guagnano 1998; Zelezny, Chua, and Aldrich 2000; Tranter 2011). 
However, whether environmental attitudes issues would actually predict attitudes towards 
renewables is a more difficult question, as one may easily foresee that strong 
environmental attitudes also may foster reluctance towards renewable energy, as it can be 
seen as a threat towards both biodiversity and vulnerable natural areas due to large area 
demands. While there has been little discussion of why age and gender would play a role in 
influencing attitudes, they seemed to have played a role in previous empirical 
investigations. Therefore, we have chosen to include these as variables to study in this 
paper. 
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New renewables are also clearly a political question, touching upon issues such as local 
industrial development, construction of infrastructure and larger issues of security of 
energy supply and increasing electricity demand, environmental protection, as well as 
climate mitigation policy. Some of these questions obviously fall outside the classic left-
right political scale, making single-issue politics pertinent to the question of opposition to 
renewables. Thus, it is interesting to look at how links between party preference and 
environmental attitudes influence views on energy technologies.  
Party preference and political views 
Very little scholarly work has been done on the connection between voters’ political 
preferences and their attitudes towards renewable energy. This is somewhat surprising 
given the highly political nature of much of the debate surrounding renewables. One reason 
might be that environmental issues do not easily fit into a traditional left-right policy 
pattern, as they in a sense are a more recent political development than the types of 
questions that were the focus of the earliest political parties (Rootes 1995). In spite of this, 
there is evidence that agreeing with a party on one issue makes voters more likely to adopt 
that party’s policies on other issues, bringing personal opinions in line with the party’s 
stance (Gerber, Huber, and Washington 2009). This means that those parties that do not 
traditionally have a strong environmental focus have a chance to affect their voters’ 
attitudes towards energy issues, sometimes by “de-sensitising” them to environmental 
issues by placing a higher priority on other matters, such as industrial development. 
These indications point towards party politics or political party preference being an 
important factor in informing citizens’ views on energy questions, but do not say much 
about the general direction of this influence or how political party preference relates to 
support of different renewable energy technologies. Some evidence that voters of left-wing 
parties are generally more environmentally oriented than others exists (Neumayer 2004).  
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Empirical findings suggest that political beliefs are correlated with social acceptance of 
different low carbon technologies, although these studies are not particularly fine-grained 
when it comes to distinguishing between different types of social acceptance 
(Wüstenhagen, Wolsink, and Bürer 2007b). They also do not differentiate between 
different types of technologies. However, one study of UK citizens’ views on demand side 
measures such as making changes in personal behaviour versus supply side measures such 
as constructing more renewables showed that demand side measures are what separate 
left-wing and right-wing voters rather than supply side matters, meaning that the possible 
construction of new renewables was not as clear-cut a political identifier as for example 
recycling (Poortinga et al. 2012). 
More is known about voters’ party preference and more general environmental values, at 
least in Norway. When it comes to the general question of the place of environmental 
issues in Norwegian politics, it can be noted that since its rise to prominence in the political 
debate towards the end of the 1980s, environmental values have been a factor for 
Norwegian voters in their consideration of which party to vote for (Valen, Aardal, and Vogt 
1990), but for most it has not been decisive in choice of party (Tjernshaugen, Aardal, and 
Gullberg 2011). However, with increased media and public attention to climate issues in the 
wake of recent IPCC reports, the political parties have focused more on climate issues in 
their programs (Gullberg 2009). 
In the case of the UK, Populus (2005) indicated that 37% of individuals indicating support 
for the Conservative party were supportive of new nuclear power stations (in comparison 
to only 12% of Labour supporters and 14% Liberal Democrat) whilst being less strongly 
supportive of new renewable energy developments (62% as against 86% and 84% 
respectively). We also know from prior research that willingness to pay to address 
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environmental problems is influenced by partisanship in Australia, environmental concerns 
being generally much stronger among Labour and Green supporters (Tranter 2011).    
Data, material and methods 
We set out to research public attitudes towards renewable energy with large scale opinion 
polls as data. In this way this analysis stands out from the growing field in the area of public 
engagement and acceptance of renewables that has been more interested in studying 
specific instances of localised public resistance rather than the more general politics of 
renewables – a distinction Michael (2009) has termed the difference between Publics-in-
Particular (PiPs) and Publics-in-General (PiGs). PiPs can be broadly defined as those publics 
that have an identifiable stake in a particular scientific or technological issues or 
controversies. Public-in-general is what we most often think of as in terms of an 
undifferentiated whole often seen as an equivalent of ‘society’ and composed of persons 
who are politically capable in principle (Michael and Brown 2000). 
This paper is based upon two sets of survey data from a representative sample of 
population of Norwegian citizens taken from projects called “The Deregulated Consumer” 
(N=1500, sampled autumn 2009), a one-off collaboration between the Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology and various electricity companies and “The Climate 
Barometer” (N=1032, sampled autumn 2011), a biannual survey of Norwegian consumers’ 
attitudes on environmental issues carried out by the analysis company TNS Gallup. The 
surveys consisted of questions on a broad range of energy related issues. Here we will 
concentrate on the responses to questions about various types of renewable energy. 
Through the analysis of survey data on these questions, it is possible to get a more general 
overview of the state of attitudes towards renewables than specific case studies can 
provide. It should be noted, however, that there are limits to the explanatory power of this 
type of data. Aggregated survey data does not say much about the larger social context 
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these attitudes are formed within, and is ill suited to capturing small, but potentially 
powerful resistance. Similarly, the types of standardised questions utilised in questionnaires 
cannot to a large degree capture certain types of information, such as how much 
knowledge an individual actually has about renewables (that would require longer, more in-
depth interviews) or the way respondents associate their attitudes towards renewables 
with attitudes they might have towards other issues of a political nature. As a final caveat 
we add that there is evidence for considerable differences in public support for renewables 
in various countries (Gelissen 2007), so the findings we present are not necessarily 
applicable outside Norway. 
The data is analysed using simple correlation measures, as well as ordinary least squares 
regression using background variables selected with an eye to the theoretical debates 
discussed above. The way these methods are utilised in relation to the theories discussed 
above will be dealt with in the findings section. 
Public attitudes to different energy technologies 
In this section, we present the findings from the survey data. Mainly, the statistical tests are 
carried out on the data from the Climate Barometer survey, as it contains relevant 
background variables– especially the question of political preference. The Deregulated 
Consumer survey is used as a control where applicable, to corroborate the data from the 
Climate Barometer. 
Before presenting the statistical tests, it can be useful to look at the simple distributions of 
attitudes. The graph below shows the attitudes of respondents to a selection of energy 
technologies, taken from the Deregulated Consumer data. 
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As can be seen from the graph, people are generally positive to most energy technologies in 
the sample, with the mean lying close to the “somewhat positive” answer. The clear 
exception is gas without carbon capture and storage, which is predominantly viewed 
negatively. Gas with CCS is also somewhat ambiguously viewed, with a mean score almost 
exactly on the “neither positive nor negative” category. 
Exploring  the role of party preference and background variables 
Based on the theoretical arguments presented above and the relevant socio-demographic 
variables in the survey, we performed a least squares regression analysis of the attitudes 
towards different energy technologies with a series of relevant background variables, 
including party preference, as independent variables. The following tables, taken from the 
Climate Barometer, present the regression coefficients for the attitudes towards different 
energy technologies. The variables used in the analysis are age, gender, party preference, 
education (low/high) and income. 
Table 1: Regression results for energy technologies 
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Attitudes to different energy technologies 
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Constant 4.405 4.611 4.497 3.907 2.766 2.560 
Age -.07* -.10** .05 .00 .26** .04 
Gender -.00 .01 -.19** .11** -.15** .05 
Income -.01 -.02 -.03 -.04 -.01 .11** 
Education -.07* -.04 .05 -.00 -.02 -.10** 
Labour Party .01 .08 .01 .03 .12** -.05 
Progress Party† -.02 .01 .02 -.02 .04 .06 
Conservative Party .11** .13** .07 -.01 .12** .04 
Christian Democrat Party .02 .03 .03 -.01 -.02 -.08* 
Centre Party .02 .07 -.06 -.01 .04 -.02 
Socialist Left Party .02 .08* -.01 .06 .04 -.13** 
Liberal Party††† .05 .06 -.01 .03 .07* -.11** 
R-squared .02 .02 .06 .02 .13 .07 
N 1017 1007 1011 969 910 904 
Standardized coefficients reported 
* and ** indicate significance at the .05 and .01 level, respectively. 
† The Progress Party can be characterised as right-wing populist. 
†† The Liberal party roughly corresponds to the UK liberal democrats. 
 
Table 1 shows that older people are generally more sceptical towards onshore and offshore 
wind than younger people, and more favourable towards gas with CCS. Here, age is used as 
a continuous variable. When age is broken down into generational segments, it becomes 
clear that it is people over the age of 60 that are significantly negative to renewables. 
Women are more prone to have positive attitudes towards bioenergy than men, and are 
more negative towards hydropower than men. Women’s tendency to be more negative 
towards hydropower might be explained by the fact that women are generally more 
environmentally oriented than men and that hydropower is seen as having the highest 
impact on nature. Another notable feature of these tables is the presence of definite party 
preferences in the cases of energy sources that are not renewable, as in gas with or without 
CCS. For the most part, voters’ views on these technologies correlate well with the 
distinction between industry oriented and environmentally oriented political parties. As 
explained in the section on Norwegian energy politics, gas is pretty unpopular on average 
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due to high emissions, but even more so among voters of parties that emphasise their 
environmental profile. One telling exception is gas with CCS, which is viewed favourably by 
the environmentally minded voters of the Liberal Party, as well as by the industry friendly 
Conservatives and Labour party voters. This points to the complicated discussion over the 
environmental merits of CCS (Daamen et al. 2011). Whether or not these issues are partly 
the reason voters affiliate with certain parties or whether the parties shape their voters’ 
attitudes towards these matters is unclear, but there are signs that agreeing with a party on 
one policy tends to make voters align more closely with the policies of that party on other 
issues (Gerber, Huber, and Washington 2009). 
Political views and renewables 
As noted above, renewable construction touches upon a host of political issues, and 
different parties across the political spectrum might give varying weight to these. We 
examine the correlations between a positive view of various renewables (and some non-
renewables) and preferences for various groups in Norwegian politics, based on self-
reporting of voting in the last general election. The voters are placed in blocks according to 
two criteria: the first is a left-right scale based on the political parties’ views on economic 
policy, and is a traditional delineation in Norwegian politics (Ryghaug and Jenssen 1999). 
The parties in the blocks are Sosialistisk Venstreparti (Socialist Left Party, SV) and 
Arbeiderpartiet (Labour Party, AP) in the “left” block, Kristelig Folkeparti (Christian 
Democrats, KrF), Venstre (Liberal Party, V) and Senterpartiet (Centre Party, SP) in the 
“centre” block, and Høyre (Conservative Party, H) and Fremskrittpartiet (Progress Party, 
FrP) in the “right” block. 
Not all political divisions follow the traditional left-right schema. Environmental issues can 
to a certain degree be said to comprise a separate political axis, where some voters on the 
right can agree with some on the left in putting environmental concerns before industrial 
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development or jobs, and vice versa. The second block is based on the parties’ public profile 
for being “environmentally friendly”, prioritizing conservation efforts or the cleanest 
renewables regardless of cost, and “industry friendly”, which is more concerned with jobs 
and cost-efficient investments in the power infrastructure (Tjernshaugen, Aardal, and 
Gullberg 2011). In the environment block we find SV, SP, KrF and V, and in the industry 
block AP, H and FrP4. One way of testing the assumption of environmental and industrial 
focus among voters is to check the two blocks against some more general questions about 
the state of the environment and energy system of the world. Table 2 shows some 
correlations between statements about the environment and the answers among the two 
blocks. The responses are on a five-point Likert scale where positive correlation implies 
agreement with the statement. 
Table 2: Correlations between political blocks and statements about the environment 
 Industry Environment 
I am worried about the consequences of global 
warming 
-.13** .16** 
I think climate change is caused by human action -.18** .21** 
Norway doesn’t put enough effort into constructing 
new renewables 
.07* .04 
The world’s energy demand will have to be met by oil 
and gas for a long time 
.18** -.20** 
More hydro is needed for Norway to meet its 
emissions goals 
.12** -.13** 
The Norwegian power industry is concerned about 
climate change 
.03 -.08** 
The Norwegian power industry is concerned about 
conservation 
.05 -.11** 
                                                          
4
 Note that these three parties are by far the largest in Norwegian politics, and this block amounts to 
about 75 % of votes. 
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The Norwegian power industry is developing more 
climate friendly production techniques 
.04 -.09** 
i * and ** denote significance below the .05 and .01 level, respectively. 
 
From Table 2 it should be clear that there is a definitive distinction between political blocks, 
with the conflict lines being interest in and concern about environmental issues on the one 
hand and a more engineering and construction oriented political worldview. 
There is some overlap between the two block categories of left-right and environmental-
industrial. The parties on the right are both in the industrial block, while the centre parties 
have a very environmentally oriented profile. In this issue, it is the left that is split between 
industrial and environmental concerns. A look at the correlations between the blocks 
reveals this: The opinions of right-wing voters are strongly correlated with the industry 
block (r = .570, sig. < .01) and the centre with the environment block (r = .698, sig. < .01), 
while the left is positively correlated with both blocks (industry: r = .229, sig. < .01, 
environment: r = .081, sig. < .01), with slightly stronger correlation with the industrial block 
due to the Labour Party being by far the largest party on the left.  
Table 3: Correlations for various renewable energy technologies and preference for 
different political blocks 
 Left Centre Right Industry Environment 
Onshore wind -.02 .06 -.00 -.03 .05 
Offshore wind .02 .03 .02 .01 .05 
Hydro -.04 -.03 .10** .08** -.01 
Gas w/ CCS .02 -.01 .10** .16** -.06 
Bio-energy .07* -.00 -.06* -.03 .05 
Coal w/o CCS -.08* -.07* .03 .04 -.15** 
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Gas w/o CCS -.11** -.12** .16** .14** -.21** 
i * and ** denote significance below the .05 and .01 level, respectively. 
 
Table 3 reveals some interesting phenomena. Firstly, with no significant correlations, wind 
power does not “belong” to any of the political blocks. This could indicate that voters either 
see wind both as an environmental measure and as industrial development, and therefore 
a win-win solution, or as ambiguous because the benefits do not easily outweigh the 
drawbacks. Secondly, hydro – a clean, cheap and abundant resource in Norway that carries 
with it some large negative effects of damming up creeks, rivers and lakes – is more 
favourably viewed by the right and industrial blocks than by the rest. This might be 
explained by its connection to Norway’s industrial production base (especially in the so-
called power intensive industry sector, mostly aluminium production) as well as its history 
of controversy detailed above. 
The third notable finding here has to do with gas plants. There has been a heated debate 
about the use of gas in power plants in Norway, and the issue seems to divide the voters. 
The centre-left government have announced their plans to construct large-scale carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) facilities in order to start utilising more gas in electricity 
production without increasing emissions of CO2. These plans have assuaged the 
environmentally minded somewhat (which might be why there is no clear correlation 
between the left, centre and environment blocks and the issue of gas plants with CCS), but 
also represent a significant cost to the construction of new gas plants. This last point can 
explain the most polarised of the above technologies, gas plants without CCS. Clearly, this is 
unacceptable for the environmentally oriented voters on the left and in the centre, while 
the cheaper construction cost of these plants might explain why right voters are even more 
strongly in favour of this option than the one with CCS. 
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Table 4 breaks down the political preference correlations on the individual party level. 
While it mostly confirms the impression from the block data, a few things are worth noting. 
The most important is that some parties’ voters have much more polarised views on these 
issues than others. For example, Labour Party voters do not deviate from the average in 
their attitudes concerning any of the electricity generation options, and neither do those 
voting for Christian Democrats or the Centre Party. In contrast, the voters of the 
Conservative Party are strongly in favour of gas power plants (and also onshore wind and 
hydro), while voters of the Socialist Left Party and the centre-right Liberal Party are equally 
opposed. This can either imply that gas plants are clearer examples of an energy technology 
that is less ambiguous in terms of the trade-off between environmental and industrial 
concerns than for example wind, or that this specific issue has been made into a political 
talking point, where the involved parties already have invested prestige in backing or 
opposing the issue – or a combination of the two. 
Table 4: Correlations for various renewables and specific party preferencei 
 Ap FrP H KrF Sp SV V 
Onshore wind -.03 -.04 .09** .01 -.00 -.01 .03 
Offshore wind -.00 -.05 .06 -.00 .03 .03 .02 
Hydro -.01 .02 .09** .04 -.07** -.03 -.02 
Gas w/ CCS .07* .02 .10** -.05 .01 -.03 .03 
Bio-energy .03 -.04 -.04 -.02 -.02 .06 .02 
Coal w/o CCS .01 .06 -.01 -.04 -.01 -.12** -.08* 
Gas w/o CCS -.01 .10** .11** -.07* -.02 -.14** -.10** 
i 
* and ** denote significance below the .05 and .01 level, respectively. 
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Conclusion 
In this article we do not focus on case studies within particular developments that have to 
be understood in a context where publics are viewed as something in particular, pinned 
down spatially, normally in some geographical area that is deemed to be the site of some 
techno scientific impact (Michael 2009). Rather, we have framed our analysis as a study of 
the general public, with a particular focus on the influence of socio-demographic variables 
and political preferences on renewable energy.    
Our analysis reveals that most people are positive towards renewable energy sources. This 
is in line with previous studies. Given the paradoxical and unsettled role of new production 
from renewable energy technologies in the Norwegian energy system the positive attitudes 
are still noteworthy. We also find that attitudes towards renewable sources vary, and that 
there are differences between new renewable sources and conventional sources like gas – 
although that picture is complicated by the inclusion of CCS technology which is met with 
slightly more positive views than conventional coal and gas plants.  
The analysis also revealed that most socio-demographic variables to a little degree can 
explain attitudes towards energy sources, whereas there are interesting relationships 
between political preferences and attitudes towards energy sources and technologies, 
something which has been largely overlooked by earlier studies in this area.  
We find a clear correlation between people’s preferences for parties that emphasize 
environmental values and their attitudes concerning energy installations. This pertains 
especially to the types of energy installations that cannot be said to be environmentally 
friendly, such as gas or coal plants. We also find that those types of renewables that can be 
tied to other values than environmentalism, for example through association with industrial 
development, enjoy a more cross-political support than those that are seen as only 
mitigating climate issues. 
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In light of the focus of much research on public perception of renewables, we believe the 
findings of this paper should challenge some assumptions about the role of policy regarding 
renewables. The differences in views on different kinds of renewable energy technologies 
point to the need to avoid treating renewable technologies as one monolithic category. If 
the findings presented in this paper hold for other parts of the world, current theories on 
renewable energy opposition must take into account the heterogeneous nature of these 
technologies, both in their specific contexts and more generally, as we have treated it here . 
This point was also made by McGowan and Sauter (2005), who revealed that public opinion 
in general is not linked to renewable energy as an aggregate term, but to specific 
renewable energy technologies, solar being the most popular renewable source of energy 
in the UK. Similarly, the connection between voters’ party preference and their views on 
different renewable technologies hint at the importance of the framing of new 
developments in terms of industry development or environmental costs when they are 
presented to the public. 
Earlier studies of attitudes on renewables have concentrated on ethnographically oriented 
work on Publics-in-Particular that are directly affected by new developments. By adding 
information about party preferences to the usual survey questions about attitudes towards 
renewable energy, we have demonstrated that  the Public-in-General is also is a meaningful 
category worth of study, as such preferences and political views can be important factors 
related to the support of renewable energy technologies. Our research indicates that the 
support of renewables crosscut the traditional left-right party delineation in Norwegian 
politics. Support is better explained by two blocs: an industrialist versus environmental 
protectionist blocs. These two blocs do however not represent the two more stable 
coalitions in Norwegian politics, who for the most part are still dominated by the Labour 
party dominated left and the Conservative party dominated right (in opposition).  In line 
with this, it is reasonable to think that the fact that the energy issue (and to a large party 
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climate and environmental protection policy) in Norway seems to crosscut the traditional 
left-right coalitions might have contributed to taming this as a conflict line and salient 
political issue for some time. We believe that examining in what way renewable energy 
policies intersect with politics-as-usual can be a relevant future research topic. 
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